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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
IVAN LARSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20031033-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals a judgment and conviction of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a 
Child, a First-Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-404.1(3) and § 76-
1-601, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. Jurisdiction is proper both in this 
court as well as the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002). However this case was transferred to this Court under Utah 
Code Ann., § 78-2-2(4). [See Addendum 1]. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: What is the standard of review concerning statements in opening and 
closing argument that were not objected to? 
Standard of Review: the appellate standard of review is the plain error standard. 
State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, f 13, 57 P.3d 1139; State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 
333-334 (1993). "To constitute plain error, three elements must be established: (i) an 
error did in fact occur; (ii) the error should have been obvious; and (iii) the error is 
harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, f 41,57 P.3d 1149; State v. Olsen, 860 
P.2d 332, 334 (1993). 
Issue: Did the Prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct when he told the jury 
that he believed that the evidence was overwhelming and made other first person 
statements, and referred to medical evidence that was never presented at during trial? 
Standard of Review: The standard applicable to reviewing alleged prejudicial 
remarks of counsel is whether the remarks call the attention of the jurors to matters they 
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and whether the jurors 
were likely influences by the improper remarks in reaching their verdict. State v. 
Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in full 
in Addendum B: 
UTAH CONST. ART. 1, § 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 1st, 2003, defendant was charged by information with Aggravated 
Sexual Abuse of a Child. Following a preliminary hearing the defendant was bound over 
for trial. 
On October 2nd, 2003, a jury convicted the defendant of Aggravated Sexual Abuse 
of a Child. Tr. 150:11-13. On December 2nd, 2003, the defendant was sentenced five to 
life in prison, credit for time served in Grand County Jail, and restitution was left open. 
Defendant timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Case of Prejudicial Prosecutorial Comments 
During the first part of the year 2002, Amber Larsen ("Amber") told her mother, 
Barbara Butterfield ("Ms. Butterfield") some disturbing information. Tr. 55:15-19, 22. 
Amber told Barbara that Amber's father, Ivan Larsen ("Defendant"), had touched Amber 
in her private areas. Tr 56: 20-21. Subsequently, Amber was interviewed by Moab City 
Police Officer Edward Guerrero ("Officer Guerrero") on two separate occasions. Tr. 4-6. 
The first interview was on January 8th and the second on February 15th. Tr. 127 7-8. 
In these interviews with Officer Guerrero, Amber revealed that Amber's father 
had touched her private parts or vaginal area while in the bathroom. Tr. 115:7-9. Also, 
Amber revealed that her father had put arrow shafts in her behind and into her vaginal 
area. Tr. 113:6-7. Amber described the arrow shafts as long stick with feathers on the 
end. Tr. 113:16-17. 
During the second interview when Officer Guerrero asked Amber questions, 
Amber would change the answers back and forth. Tr. 121:1-2, 19-21. Officer Guerrero 
asked Amber whether Amber's father touched her private parts and Amber answered yes. 
Tr. 118:22-23. Officer Guerrero asked the same question again and Amber would answer 
no. Tr. 119:1 -2. Later in the interview Officer Guerrero asked Amber whether Amber's 
father ever came to the bathroom with Amber. Tr. 120:14-16. Amber answered in the 
negative. Tr. 120:15-16. 
At trial, Amber testified that her father is Charles and then testifies that Ivan 
Larsen is her father. Tr. 86:2-3, 6-13. Several questions later, Amber testified that her 
father touched Amber's vagina and bottom. Tr. 93:16-24. Shortly thereafter, Amber 
testified that her father stuck arrows in Amber's bottom and vagina more than one time. 
Tr. 1-20. 
At the close of the prosecution's case, Mr. Fitzgerald, the Defendant's attorney, 
moved for a directed verdict and asserted that the prosecution did not properly identify 
the defendant. Tr. 130:22-25. Mr. Fitzgerald also asserted that the evidence presented, 
Amber's contradicting statements as to whether Amber was improperly touched, was 
insufficient evidence for a jury to convict. Tr. 131:2-5. Judge Anderson denied the 
motion by stating: 
I understand one of those is a reasonable jury would have to acquit - have to have 
a reasonable doubt. I don't think that's the case. I think taking into consideration 
the way children are, they may very well, and appropriately, decide that they 
believe her and, ah - and, ah, although they certainly don't have to. And if they 
did, it would be reasonable for them to convict him. 
Um, on the other, the identification, I guess the most of the issue from not having 
pointed specifically at him, the most you have there is the question of whether we 
actually have the defendant present during the trial. But she clearly identified a 
person known as Ivan, who is her father. Her name is Amber Larsen. I think it's 
reasonable to infer Ivan Larsen is the person she was talking about. So I think we 
have an Ivan Larsen. Maybe not the person who's sitting here in the courtroom, 
but an Ivan Larsen, nonetheless, who's been identified by her. So if you really 
think that she's got the wrong Ivan Larsen, ah, you're welcome to make that 
point. But she doesn't have to point right at him and say, "That's the man, " 
unless she doesn't - know, if you don't know the name of someone, sometimes 
you have to point right at 'em. But if you know their name, then you don't have 
to refer to them, point at them. 
Tr. 131:6-25 &Tr 132:1-3. 
Later during the prosecution's closing argument, the prosecutor stated that 
in my opinion - and I guess everybody has a different opinion about what 
somebody says, but a mother who keeps track of a child knows when they're at 
the neighbor's house, knows who they're playing with, checks on 'em every half 
an hour or so is, to me, being fairly responsible. I don't think that Barbara 
Butterfield could have done anything, could have recognized before the fact that 
her husband was going to abuse her daughter and could have saved her from 
that." 
Tr. 145:2-10. 
A few moments later the prosecutor stated that '"Ah, counsel tried to get Mz. 
Butterfield to admit things. He said, "Now didn't - isn't this what she - isn't this what, 
ah, Amber said in this? Isn't this what she said?" That's not what I remember."' Tr. 12-
15. 
Further into the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor addresses medical 
evidence. 
Medical evidence. Ladies and gentlemen, that's gonna come under the category 
that I said of some of these other things. Maybe you're wondering why there's no 
medical evidence. But - but if there are medical reports in that file that talk about 
this thing, it's just as easy for the defense to subpoena those witnesses as it is for 
the prosecution. If I don't feel that kind of evidence is gonna help you in our 
decision, then I don't subpoena that witness. Tr. 146:16-23. 
Now why would medical evidence possibly not help in a decision? If we have a 
Medical Examiner take a look at a little girl and they say, "We've examined this 
girl and we can't either affirm or preclude what her statements are. We can't say 
yes or no," then that doesn't really help you, does it? Get somebody down here 
from Salt Lake City to tell you, "We can't say yes or no," means you know what? 
Tr. 146:24-25 & 147:1-5. 
Let me make another point. If I get a rape victim that was raped yesterday and we 
have her examined, then what we have is things like cuts, bruises, swelling so 
forth. If this person was abused two weeks ago and they examined her, then 
maybe they say, "You know what? The opening's consistent with having been 
penetrated, but we can't-there's not bruising. We can't say that he did it. We 
can't say that it was done by an arrow. Tr. 147:6-13 
So why do they want you to think about medical evidence, ladies and gentlemen? 
And if we're gonna raise a reasonable doubt about that, ladies and gentlemen, it's 
supposed to be something more than fancy imagination or wholly speculative 
possibility. You don't have any medical evidence supports the fact that this girl 
wasn't abused. Tr. 147: 14-19. 
Concluding the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor states '"If you have 
had a doubt raised, you have to be able to say to yourself, "How is that - have I had some 
kind of a doubt draw into this thing, based upon itself evidence that I heard?" I say that 
you haven't ladies and gentlemen.'" Tr. 22-25. 
And then the prosecutor concludes, "Ah, my belief is that the evidence in this case 
from Amber Larsen, from all of her statements, from her interviews is -overwhelming. 
The elements of this case have been met." Tr. 149:2-5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point 1: The prosecutor made statements in the opening and closing argument 
that constitute prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor called to the attention of 
the jury matters they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict. 
Point 2: Under the particular circumstances of the case, the jurors were 
influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their verdict. Thus, the defendant's 
Constitutional right to an fair and impartial trial was violated. UTAH CONST. ART. 1, § 
12. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS IN THE OPENING AND CLOSING 
STATEMENT CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND 
PREJUDICED THE JURY IN REACHING A VERDICT. 
It is well settled law in Utah that when a statement is not properly objected to 
and preserved at the trial level, the appellate standard of review is the plain error 
standard. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,1139 57 P.3d 1139; State v. Olsen, 860 
P.2d 332, 333-334 (1993). "To constitute plain error, three elements must be established: 
(i) an error did in fact occur; (ii) the error should have been obvious; and (iii) the error is 
harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 41, 57 P.3d 1149; State v. Olsen, 860 
P.2d 332, 334 (1993). Thus, because the prejudicial statements made by the prosecution 
in the opening and closing statement were not objected to, the proper appellate standard 
of review is plain error. 
The prosecutor's comments during opening and closing argument constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct.1 The two-part test for prosecutorial misconduct is first, 
whether the prosecutor's remarks, "call the attention of the jurors to matters they would 
not be justified in considering in determining their verdict." State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 
400, 402 (1986). And second, whether "under the particular circumstances of this case, 
the jurors were probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their verdict." 
Id; State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,122, 999 P.2d 7; State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(1973). 
First, the prosecutor's use of the term "I think" during the prosecutor's opening 
argument was improper and prejudicial. In State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1226 (1989), 
the court determined that "[t]he assertion of personal knowledge or opinion about the 
facts by counsel is improper" when the prosecutor repeatedly prefaced his statements 
with "I think." In comparison, the prosecutor in the case at issue stated that "I think our 
evidence is strong and will - and - you will be convinced and I will ask you to convict." 
Tr. 51 51:10-12. Hence, the prosecutor committed error when the prosecutor called to the 
attention of the jury his person knowledge and opinion in the form of "I think."2 
Second, during the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor stated that 
Because there are numerous improper comments that the prosecutor made throughout the opening and 
closing argument, and for the sake of organization, the improper comments will be dealt with 
consecutively, as they occur, starting with opening argument and ending with the closing argument. 
2
 "Expressions of personal opinion by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony and tend 
to exploit the influence of the prosecutor's office and undermine the objective detachment that should 
separate a lawyer from the cause being argued." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1227(1980) quoting ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8 (2nd ed. 1980) 
in my opinion - and I guess everybody has a different opinion about what 
somebody says, but a mother who keeps track of a child knows when they're at 
the neighbor's house, knows who they're playing with, checks on 'em every half 
an hour or so is, to me, being fairly responsible. I don't think that Barbara 
Butterfield could have done anything, could have recognized before the fact that 
her husband was going to abuse her daughter and could have saved her from 
that." 
Tr. 145:2-10. 
Again, the prosecutor states expressions of opinion and personal knowledge when 
he states "in my opinion" and "I don't think." Tr. 145:2, 7. Furthermore, the terms "in 
my opinion . . . " and "I don't think . . . " preface the assertion by the prosecutor that the 
defendant committed sexual abuse of a child. "I don't think that Barbara Butterfield 
could have done anything, could have recognized before the fact that her husband was 
going to abuse her daughter and could have saved her from that." Tr. 145:7-10. In 
essence, the prosecutor's use of the terms "in my opinion" and "I don't think" directly 
asserts through personal knowledge that the defendant committed sexual abuse of a child. 
Therefore, the prosecutor's remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict.. ." Valdez, 513 P.2d 
at 426. 
In addition, it is important to note that the improper comment is not an opinion on 
a fragment of evidence or a collateral fact of the case, but a direct conclusion that goes to 
the heart of the verdict, that "I don't think that Barbara Butterfield . . . could have 
recognized before the fact that her husband was going to abuse her daughter and could 
have saved her from that." Tr. 145:7-10. In essence, the prosecutor has improperly given 
his opinion that the defendant committed the crime. Thus, it is difficult to argue that this 
statement did not influence the jury in its verdict, satisfying the second prong of the 
prosecutorial misconduct test. 
Thirdly, a few moments later, the prosecutor makes additional improper 
comments by stating that 'Ah, counsel tried to get Mz. Butterfield to admit things. He 
said, "Now didn't - isn't this what she - isn't this what, ah, Amber said in this? Isn't this 
what she said?" That's not what I remember."' Tr. 145:12-15. Here, the prosecutor 
purportedly refers to cross examination of Ms. Barbara Butterfield (Tr. 65:23 to 81:8), 
Amber Larsen's biological mother, and dismisses the validity of the cross examination by 
stating "That's not what I remember." Tr. 145:15. Thus, the prosecution gives his 
personal opinion as to what was said by Ms. Barbara Butterfield and creates a false 
impression as to Mrs. Barbara Butterfield's testimony. The remedy for this statement can 
be found in Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (1981)(False impression of evidence that 
prosecution knowingly did not correct constitutes prosecutorial misconduct and 
influenced jury verdict depriving defendant of a fair trial). 
Fourth, and further into the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor 
improperly addresses medical evidence that was never introduced to the jury. In the well 
established case of State v. Horr, 221 P. 867, 877 (1923), "the district attorney in his 
closing argument made the statement that if the train had not been late . . . he would have 
had another witness to prove a certain controverted point." The Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial trial and elaborated on the 
district attorney's improper statement that suggested evidence that was never presented to 
the jury. 
Everyone must realize that there are exceptional cases where, although the court 
does stop counsel, and does caution the jury, the impression has been made by the 
remarks of counsel, and although the jury honestly try to ignore that impression, it 
still enters into and forms a part of the verdict. In such cases the trial court should 
set aside the verdict on a motion for a new trial. 
The prosecuting officer is usually a person of considerable influence in the 
community, and the fact that he represents the government of the United States 
lends weight and importance to his utterances. He does not occupy the position of 
a defendant's counsel, but appears before the jury clothed in the official raiment, 
discharging an official duty. The realization of these considerations should lead 
the officer to the exercise of the utmost care and caution in making statements 
before the jury, and should induce him to confine his arguments and statements to 
the testimony of the witnesses, in order that no right of the defendant is violated. 
Id. at 877. 
Furthermore, the Court continues and quotes Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N.H. 317, at page 
325. 
When counsel are permitted to state facts in argument, and to comment upon 
them, the usage of courts regulating trials is departed from, the laws of evidence 
are violated, and the full benefit of trial by jury is denied. It may be said, in 
answer to these views, that the statements of counsel are not evidence. All this is 
true; yet the necessary effect is to bring the statements of counsel to bear upon the 
verdict with more or less force, according to circumstances. If not evidence, then 
manifestly the jury have nothing to do with them, and the advocate has no right to 
make them. 
Horr, 221 P. at 877. 
Thus, at length, the Court condemns the district attorney's reference to evidence that was 
not presented at trial. 
In the case at hand, the prosecutor stated the following during closing argument. 
Medical evidence. Ladies and gentlemen, that's gonna come under the category 
that I said of some of these other things. Maybe you're wondering why there's no 
medical evidence. But - but if there are medical reports in that file that talk about 
this thing, it's just as easy for the defense to subpoena those witnesses as it is for 
the prosecution. If I don't feel that kind of evidence is gonna help you in our 
decision, then I don't subpoena that witness. Tr. 146:16-23. 
The Court goes on to further address the improper statement. "For counsel to attempt surreptitiously to 
get before the jury, facts by way of supposition, which have not been proven, is highly reprehensible; and 
the practice should be instantly repressed by the court, without waiting to be called upon by the opposite 
party." State v. Horr, 221 P. 867, 877 (1923), quoting Berry v. State of Georgia, 10 Ga. 511. 
Now why would medical evidence possibly not help in a decision? If we have a 
Medical Examiner take a look at a little girl and they say, "We've examined this 
girl and we can't either affirm or preclude what her statements are. We can't say 
yes or no," then that doesn't really help you, does it? Get somebody down here 
from Salt Lake City to tell you, "We can't say yes or no," means you know what? 
Tr. 146:24-25 & 147:1-5. 
Let me make another point. If I get a rape victim that was raped yesterday and we 
have her examined, then what we have is things like cuts, bruises, swelling so 
forth. If this person was abused two weeks ago and they examined her, then 
maybe they say, "You know what? The opening's consistent with having been 
penetrated, but we can't - there's not bruising. We can't say that he did it. We 
can't say that it was done by an arrow. Tr. 147:6-13 
So why do they want you to think about medical evidence, ladies and gentlemen? 
And if we're gonna raise a reasonable doubt about that, ladies and gentlemen, it's 
supposed to be something more than fancy imagination or wholly speculative 
possibility. You don't have any medical evidence supports the fact that this girl 
wasn't abused. Tr. 147: 14-19. 
On its face this statement is highly problematic considering that there never was medical 
evidence introduced during the trial. No doctors testified and no medical reports were 
presented to the court as exhibits. The record is completely absent of medical 
information or analysis that would allow the prosecutor to make the argument that was 
made. The statements "[y]ou don't have any medical evidence supports the fact that this 
girl wasn't abused," Tr. 147:18-19 and the statement, "Medical evidence. Ladies and 
gentlemen, that's gonna come under the category that I said of some of these other things. 
Maybe you're wondering why there's no medical evidence. But - but if there are 
medical reports in that file that talk about this thing . . . " Tr. 146:16-20, clearly places 
facts into the minds of the jury that have not been proven and prejudices the jury. 
Specifically, the prosecutor's arguments suggest medical evidence that would confirm the 
defendant's guilt. Thus, it is clear that the prosecutor called to the attention of the jury 
material that the jury would not be justified in considering in reaching its verdict. 
Also, analysis of the second prong for prosecutorial misconduct, the Hon Court 
ruled that the prosecutorial impropriety influenced the jury and the defendant did not 
have a fair and impartial jury. Hon, 221 P. 877-878. Thus, it is likely that the statements 
concerning medical evidence that were never introduced to the jury influenced the verdict 
in the present case. In fact, the improper statements concerning medical evidence are 
arguably more prejudicial than the improper statement in Hon that warranted reversal 
due to the strong impressions of condemning medical evidence was never introduced to 
the jury, again see Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (1981)(False impression of 
evidence that prosecution knowingly did not correct constitutes prosecutorial misconduct 
and influenced jury verdict depriving defendant of a fair trial). 
Fifth, concluding the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor states '"If you 
have had a doubt raised, you have to be able to say to yourself, "How is that - have I had 
some kind of a doubt draw into this thing, based upon itself evidence that I heard?" I say 
that you haven't ladies and gentlemen.'" Tr. 22-25. Again, the prosecutor makes 
improper and prejudicial statements to the jury. In effect, the prosecutor gives personal 
opinion that there is not a reasonable doubt for the jury to consider. 
Sixth, and finally, the prosecutor improperly concludes in the last sentences of his 
closing argument with his personal view as to the weight of the evidence. In State v. 
Hopkins, P.2d 475, 479 (1989), the prosecutor, during closing argument states that "The 
fact that this representative of the State is plainly impressed by the evidence is no call for 
you to be impressed by the evidence . . . It is impossible for me to convey in words in any 
capacity why the State is so impressed with the evidence in this case." Id. Based upon 
this statement, the Court reasoned that the prosecutor expressed his personal view of the 
weight of the evidence and held that "the foregoing argument is clearly directed toward a 
matter the jury would not be justified in considering and thus was improper." Id. In the 
case at hand, the prosecutor states that "Ah, my belief is that the evidence in this case 
from Amber Larsen, from all of her statements, from her interviews is -overwhelming. 
The elements of this case have been met." Tr. 149:2-5. Thus, the prosecutor's personal 
belief of the weight of the evidence being "overwhelming" is similar to the Hopkins 
prosecutor's personal expression as to the weight of the evidence being "impressive" 
beyond words.4 Therefore, it is clear that in the present case, the prosecutor called to 
attention of the jurors, matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict.5 
Furthermore, considering the second prong of the test for prosecutorial 
misconduct, whether the improper statement influenced the jury's verdict, the Hopkin 's 
Court decided that the improper statements were not enough to overturn the jury verdict 
because the improper statements were prefaced with a limiting instruction and other 
evidence in the case was strong. Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 480. 
At the outset of his comments, the prosecutor specifically advised the jury that 
what he had to say was not to be taken as evidence, and in later reiterating this 
point, he noted that each juror need make an individual assessment of the 
evidence, regardless of his view of the evidence, taken as a representative of the 
state. 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 480. 
4
 It may also be argued that the term in the present case "overwhelming" is more improper than the term 
"impressive," and hence more prejudicial especially coupled with "my belief is that . . ." Tr. 149:2 
5
 The Hopkin's Court elaborated farther that "The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses 
and expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments 
can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports 
the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the 
basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of 
the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of 
the evidence. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479-480 (1989) quoting State v. Young, 47 U.S. 1, S.Ct. 
1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1(1985). 
In contrast, in the present case, there is not a limiting instruction by the prosecutor before 
or after the improper comment and as will be argued later, the evidence in this case is not 
strong. Thus, the full effect of the improper comment, not softened by limiting argument, 
bares upon the jury and influences the jury in their verdict. 
Thus, from the above analysis, there is no question that the prosecutor's opening 
and especially the closing argument are replete with improper and prejudicial statements 
that constitute prosecutorial misconduct. However, as dealt with above, the second prong 
of the test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether "under the particular circumstances of 
this case, the jurors were probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their 
verdict." Id; State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,122, 999 P.2d 7; State v. Valdez] 513 P.2d 422, 
426 (1973).6 In addition, when weighing "the particular circumstances of the case, " 
Utah courts are more likely to find that prosecutorial misconduct influenced the jury 
when a case is close or the facts of the case doubtful. State v. Horr, 221 P. 867, 877 
(1923); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (1986)(" If the proof of a defendant's guilt 
is strong, we will not presume the improper remark to be prejudicial. But in a case with 
less than compelling proof, we will more closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct"). 
The particular circumstances of the case at hand are that this is not a case with 
three witnesses testifying that they directly saw something happen. This is a case where 
two witnesses Barbara Butterfield and Officer Guerrero testify of what Amber Larsen 
said in two interviews and where one witness, Amber Larsen testifies directly. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that Amber Larsen's testimony during the 
6
 The test has also been restated as "absent the improper argument, there was a reasonable likelihood of an 
outcome more favorable to defendant. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 (1989); State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 
35, \ 22, 999 P.2d 7; State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422,426 (1973). 
interviews was contradictory. Tr. 121 :l-2,19-21. Officer Guerrero asked Amber 
whether Amber's father touched her private parts and Amber answered yes. Tr. 118:22-
23. Officer Guerrero asked the same question again and Amber would answer no. Tr. 
119:1-2. Later in the interview Officer Guerrero asked Amber whether Amber's father 
ever came to the bathroom with Amber. Tr. 120:14-16. Amber answered in the negative. 
Tr. 120:15-16. Thus, Amber stated that factual events happened and then she denied the 
same. Hence, the particular circumstances of the case are that the factual evidence is 
limited and the case on the facts becomes a close one where the jury has to rely solely on 
Amber Larsen's various testimonies. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct in the 
form of improper statements in their various forms is much more likely to have 
influenced the jury's verdict because factually, the case is a close one, and the 
prosecutor's improper comments bridged the evidential gap that needed to be filled for 
the jury to reach a guilty verdict. Had that gap not been filled, the jury may have found 
the defendant not guilty. 
CUMMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE 
As discussed above, this court would be justified in finding that the defendant did 
not receive a fair and unbiased trial considering alone the improper statement concerning 
the medical evidence. This court may also make the same determination based solely 
upon the prosecutor's improper comment as to the weight of the evidence when the 
prosecutor stated that the evidence is "overwhelming." Tr. 149:5. However, this court 
may also consider the cumulative prejudice created by the entire string of improper 
7
 At trial, Amber testified that her father is Charles and then testifies that Ivan Larsen is her father. Tr. 
86:2-3, 6-13. This apparent lack of in-court identification is another example calling the facts of the case 
into dispute. Furthermore, Barbara Butterfield, testified that there were others in Amber's community that 
may have sexually abused Amber. Tr. 75:14-25, 76:1-25, 77:1-25. Again, testimony and facts that make 
this case factually borderline for the jury. 
statements made by the prosecutor and conclude that the improprieties influenced the jury 
verdict. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if 'the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." State 
v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35 ^ 25, 999 P.2d 7. Therefore, considering the numerous instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct dually with the limited factual basis, it is difficult to conclude 
or have confidence that the defendant had a fair and impartial trial. Thus, a reversal is 
warranted and is in line with the case law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests that the 
Defendant's conviction be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 2004. 
ic; y^ 
K. ANDREW FITZGfiRALD f 
Attorney for Defends"^ 
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ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT 
MAR I -20W 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Ivan Larsen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20031033-SC 
0317-083 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, this matter 
is transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. All 
further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that 
court. 
The address of the Utah Court of Appeals is: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Office of the Clerk 
450 S. State St. 
PO Box 140230 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0230 
FOR THE COURT: 
-^L//»2^g/ J-Date Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ivan Larsen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
FEB 2 6 2004 
Pauleae Stegg 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20031033-CA 
This matter is before the court on its own motion to 
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the 
Utah Supreme Court because the appeal relates to a conviction 
involving a first degree or capital felony. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (2002) . 
Dated th isj^t day of February, 2004. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Paulette Stagg, QT 
Clerk of the Court 
<5?l7'0«> 
Judith M. Billings 
Presiding Judge 
Russel l W. Bench 
Associate Presiding Judge 
J a m e s Z. Davis 
Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Judge 
Norman H. Jackson 
Judge 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
William A. Thorne, Jr. 
Judge 
®taf) Court of Ippeate 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Appellate Clerks* Office (801) 578-3900 
Judges' Reception (801) 578-3950 
FAX (801) 578-3999 
TDD (801) 578-3940 
Marilyn M. B r a n c h 
Appellate Court Administrator 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
March 4, 2004 
K. ANDREW FITZGERALD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
55 E 100 S 
MOAB UT 84532 
RE: State v. Larsen Case No, 20031033-CA 
Dear Mr. FITZGERALD 
Please be advised that this case has been assigned to the Court 
of Appeals. Further proceedings will be handled by this court. 
Please note that the case number will remain the same as it was 
in the Supreme Court, with the exception that it will have a -CA 
after the number. 
The Supreme Court file that accompanied the pourover indicates 
that you requested the transcript on January 12, 2004. Over 
thirty days have passed and the transcript has not been filed, 
nor has the court reporter filed a motion for an extension of 
time. 
As the appellant's counsel and parry requesting the transcript, 
it is your responsibility to ensure that the transcript is filed 
pursuant to Rules 11 and 12, Utah R. App. P. Please contact the 
court reporter and arrange for the transcript to be filed in the 
trial court. 
^-| 
v 
If the court reporter is unable to file the transcript, the court \j 
reporter must file a motion for an extension of time. Pursuant to ^  
Rule 12(a), Utah R. App. P., the court reporter must seek the 
extension from the clerk of the appellate court. An extension 
request from a party to th_e appeal is improper. 
Once the transcript has been filed and the trial court transmits 
a copy of the record index, a briefing schedule will be 
established and you will be notified. 
y 
ADDENDUM 2 
Utah Constitution, Article 1 § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury o the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right appeal in all cases. 
